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ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND THE ROLE
OF LAW
Richard L. Kaplan*

A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE
By Kevin Phillips. New York: Broadway Books.
2002. Pp. xxii, 473. $29.95.

WEALTH

AND

DEMOCRACY:

AMERICAN RICH.

In this ambitious book, famed commentator and analyst Kevin
Phillips attempts nothing less than a political history of American eco
nomic life with a specific focus on the wealthy. Succeeding far more
often than not, Phillips interweaves the development of American
technology with the rise and fall of economic fortunes, crafting a
compelling tale with significant implications for the formulation of
public policy and the laws that implement such policy.
Festooned with more than seventy charts and graphs, the book
explains how wealth has been accumulated throughout the entire
history of the United States. It is full of intriguing insights and
demands serious consideration of its message and warnings. For
example, one of the book's persistent themes is that concentration of
economic power inevitably corrupts the political process - a point
dramatized in recent debates about campaign finance, including the
valiant efforts of Senator John McCain and former Senator Bill
Bradley in the most recent presidential-election campaign. But Phillips
goes further to show how the political process, thus corrupted, spews
forth public policies that protect its patrons, often at the expense of
the masses whose votes theoretically sustain that process.
Even more important, Phillips shows how the economic concentra
tion that corrupts the political process came about - namely, through
exploiting public policies for private gain. As he states with unflinch
ing clarity: "Laissez-faire is a pretense. Government power and
preferment have been used by the rich, not shunned" (p. xiv).
At this point, a brief biographical note about Mr. Phillips is essen
tial. A self-described Republican, he was the chief political analyst to
Richard Nixon's successful presidential campaign in 1968. One can
begin to appreciate how much the American political landscape has
changed since that time from his reference to President Nixon's
support for national health insurance and "income maintenance for
the poor" (p. viii). Such positions today might jeopardize his standing
*
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in the Democratic party, let alone the Republican party! The political
evolution of this transformation and its implications for various legal
regimes are the focus of this commentary.
I.

R IS I NG ECONOMIC INEQUALITY

In recent years, there has been a growing awareness that the gap
between rich and poor in America is increasing.1 Whether measured in
terms of annual income, percentage of financial assets owned, or the
earnings of corporate executives compared to ordinary workers, the
incontrovertible evidence shows that more and more economic
resources are controlled by fewer and fewer people. One study
revealed that the percentage of total household wealth held by the top
one percent of families grew from twenty percent in 1976 to over forty
percent in 1997 (p. 123). Another report found that ninety percent of
the top quintile's increase in wealth accrued to just the top one per
cent (p. xiii). Phillips arranges his charts and stories with devastating
effect: the very rich really are getting richer, and almost everyone else
is either stagnating or declining. What Phillips adds to this discussion,
however, is historical perspective and insightful explanation of the
forces that produced this unparalleled concentration of income and
wealth.
In Chapter One, for example, he examines how wealth was created
during the early centuries of our country's existence. He explicates the
role of inheritance laws by showing that for the richest families of 1828
to 1848, the surest path to wealth was to have rich parents (p. 23). The
later rise of the so-called "robber barons" is then chronicled, though a
fascinating comparison of the wealthiest household's assets to median
household wealth shows that the storied accumulations of Cornelius
Vanderbilt, Jean Paul Getty, and even John D. Rockefeller pale by
comparison to that of Bill Gates today (p. 38).
The book examines the twentieth century in great detail, from the
growth of the oil and steel fortunes in the Progressive Era (pp. 49-54),
through the Great Depression, World War II, and subsequent events.
Of particular interest to today, of course, is what Phillips describes as
the "Great Technology Mania" of the 1990s (p. 98). It was during this
period that economic inequality grew beyond all previous patterns. In
1999, for example, "'the richest 2.7 million Americans, the top 1 per1. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY
(1999); James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825 (2001); see
also Koen Caminada & Kees Goudswaard, International Trends in Income Inequality and
Social Policy, 8 INT'L TAX & PUB. FIN. 395 (2001); Ray Bashara, The $6,000 Solution,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2003, at 91; Orlando Patterson, Beyond Compassion,
DAEDALUS, Winter 2002, at 26; Sean Wilenz, America's Lost Egalitarian Tradition,
DAEDALUS, Winter 2002, at 66. See generally Christopher Jencks, Does Inequality Matter?,
DAEDALUS, Winter 2002, at 49.
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cent, will have as many after-tax dollars to spend as the bottom 100
million' " (p. 103). The then-raging stock market was a major factor:
"Of the stock market gains between 1989 and 1997, some 86 percent
flowed to the top 10 percent of households. Slightly over 42 percent
went to the top 1 percent alone" (p. 107).
One of Phillips's most important insights regards the active role of
public policy in fostering and maintaining this concentration of wealth.
One fascinating chart (pp. 105-06) details the "financial bailouts"
during 1980-2000 from the Federal Reserve Board, the U.S. Treasury
Department, and various instrumentalities - like the Resolution
Trust Corporation for beleaguered savings and loan companies - that
were created in response to specific financial calamities. Clearly, the
resulting accumulation of wealth during this period had as much to do
with dependence on government largesse as it did on rugged individu
alism or other nostrums of a merit-based culture centered on risks and
rewards.
Phillips proceeds to demolish one major myth of our political
economy after another. Far from President John F. Kennedy's hope
that "a rising tide lifts all boats," recent U.S. history suggests that the
past quarter-century of economic activity bestowed its benefits on only
certain boats, specifically on yachts. Thus, after-tax income during
1977-1994 actually declined for the lower three quintiles and increased
by only four percent for the next-to-the-highest quintile (p. 137). The
real growth was at the top. Even within the top quintile, income
growth was skewed to the highest ranked, with the top one percent
seeing an increase in after-tax income of seventy-two percent (p. 137).
Similarly, despite all the press about America becoming a nation of
stockholders, ninety percent of all shares are held by the top ten
percent of households (p. 142).
These statistics actually disguise the true fate of America's middle
class during this period, which is grimmer than has been generally
acknowledged. Phillips points out that middle-class families have
maintained their levels of economic well-being only by "sen[ding] new
waves of women into the labor markets" (p. 113). As a result, the
United States now has "the world's highest ratio of two-income
households, with its hidden, de facto tax on time and families" (p.
113). Further comparisons with other Western industrialized countries
make the United. States look even worse: "[T]he typical American
worked 350 hours more per year than the typical European, the
equivalent of nine work weeks" (p. 113). And for what? American
wage earners have "less pension and health coverage as well as . . . the
Industrial West's least amount of vacation time, shortest maternity
leaves, and shortest average notice of termination" (p. 113; emphasis
added).
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This point bears further underscoring. Almost half of American
workers have no pension coverage beyond Social Security. 2 When I
served as a delegate to the National Summit on Retirement Savings3
last year, I observed that most of the discussion focused on getting
Americans to save more for their retirement. Administration officials
enthused about recently enacted legislation that increased the amount
that could be saved through various tax-favored savings vehicles, such
as so-called 401(k) plans, individual retirement accounts, and the like. 4
But these arrangements miss the essential point that U.S. employers
have increasingly reduced their funding of employees' retirement, 5
deferring instead to these voluntary options.
The situation with health-care coverage is even worse. Phillips
points out that "only 26 percent of employees in the bottom 10
percent had health insurance provided by their companies" (p. 133).
Indeed, eighty-four percent of Americans without health insurance are
in families with at least one employed person6 - a situation with no
counterpart in any other industrialized democracy. President Bill
Clinton tried to address this situation in 1993,7 but that effort was
defeated ignominiously.8 Indeed, some commentators attribute the
loss of the Congress by Democrats in 1994, in part, to this attempt at
fundamental health-care reform.9 And this episode occurred during
one of the greatest expansions of the U.S. economy! Apparently, a
rising tide does not lift all boats.

2. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS (JCX-71-02, 2002), at 28 (stating that
fifty-six percent of full-time private-sector employees have an employer-sponsored pension
plan). There are significant variations in pension plan coverage among racial groups. See
Yung-Ping Chen & Thomas D. Leavitt, The Widening Gap Between White and Minority
Pension Coverage, in PUBLIC POLICY AND AGING 82 (2001). Gender differences, in contrast,
are virtually nonexistent. See Craig Copeland, Pension Coverage: Examining CPS Data,
EBRI NOTES, Sept. 2000, at 1 .
3. This conference o f experts o n retirement savings was convened pursuant t o 2 9 U.S_.C.
§ 1 147 (2000).
4. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §§
601(a), 61 1 (d)(l), (e)(2), (f)(2), 115 Stat. 38, 94, 97-99 (amending I.RC. §§ 219 (b)(5),
402(g)(l), 457(e)(15), 408(p)(2) (1986); codified as amended in scattered sections of l.R.C.).
5. See Dallas L. Salisbury, Current and Emerging
PUBLIC POLICY AND AGING, supra note 2, at 60.

Trends in Employee Benefits,. in

6. PAUL FRONSTIN, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RES. INST., BRIEF NO. 252, SOURCES OF
HEALTH INSURANCE AND. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNINSURED: ANALYSIS OF THE
MARCH 2002 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 11 (2002) (finding that four out of five
nonelderly persons with health insurance have employment-based coverage).
7.

See

Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, S. 1757, 103d Cong.§ 1001 (1993).

8. See generally THEDA SKOCPOL, BOOMERANG: CLINTON'S HEALTH SECURITY
EFFORT AND THE TURN AGAINST GOVERNMENT JN U.S. POLITICS (1996).
9. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING
AMERICAN SOCIAL INSURANCE 130 (1999).
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Phillips goes on, in an extremely important segment, to rebut the
claim that the U.S. situation has a silver lining in the form of lower
unemployment (p. 164). This oft-repeated assertion ignores the
estimates of up to six million workers who have lost their jobs but who
no longer seek employment due to depression, lack cif qualifications,
and similar reasons. Including this cohort in the ranks of the
unemployed boosts the U.S. unemployment rate to European levels,
but without the social-services support that accompanies such high
unemployment levels overseas (pp. 165, 345).
Phillips then explores the role of governmental policies in shaping
these developments. Phillips demonstrates that industry by industry from railroads to radio, from electricity to aircraft, through biotech
nology and the Internet - governmental policies on taxation,
franchises and charters, banking, trade regulation, and research
funding have played major roles in the creation of vast personal
fortunes and concentrated wealth (pp. 214-48, 294). .
The process then comes full circle when those fortunes are used to
finance political campaigns and determine future governmental
policies. Phillips traces this cycle adroitly, providing several gems
along the way. For example, a compilation of "shared characteristics"
of the Gilded Age of the 1870s, the 1920s, and the 1980-1999 period
include the following:
.

1. Conservative politics and ideology . . . .

2. Skepticism of government - from laissez-faire to program cuts and
deregulation - and emphasis on markets and the private sector. . . .
4. Replacement of public interest politics by private interest politics,
with high levels of corruption.. . .
7. Major economic and corporate restructuring - repeating merger
waves . . . leveraged buy-outs, spin-offs et al. . . .
Concentration of wealth, economic polarization, and rising levels of
inequality. (p. 297)

11.

Other gems pertain directly to campaign finance: "Large individual
donors" were the single-largest source of money in the 2000 federal
election (p. 324); three-quarters of all funds contributed by individuals
came from donors in the top one to one-and-one-half percent of
income earners (p. 326).
The rationale for, and result of, this bizarre arrangement is best
illustrated in a satirical - but accurate - advertisement on the web
site of billionairesforbushorgore.com:
While you may be familiar with stocks and bonds, currency specula
tion, IPOs and all the rest, there's a new investment arena you should be
aware of: legislation. ...
. . . Don't worry, it's completely legal. With the help of a professional
legislation broker (called a Lobbyist), you place your investment (called
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a Campaign Contribution) with a carefully selected list of legislation
manufacturers (called Members of Congress). These manufacturers then
go to work, crafting industry-specific subsidies, inserting tax breaks into
the code, extending patents or giving away public property for free.
Just check out these results. The Timber Industry spent $8 million in
campaign contributions to preserve the logging road subsidy, worth $458
million-the return on their investment was 5,725%. Glaxo Wellcome
invested $1.2 million in campaign contributions to get a 19-month patent
extension on Zantac worth $1 billion-their net return: $83,333%. The
Tobacco Industry spent $30 million in contributions for a tax break
worth $50 billion-the return on their investment: 167,000%. For a paltry
$5 million in campaign contributions, the Broadcasting Industry was able
to secure free digital TV licenses, a give-away of public property worth
$70 billion-that's an incredible 1,400,000% return on their investment.
(p. 326)

As this posting suggests, concentrated wealth is able to distort
democratic processes for private enrichment, and the amazing aspect
of this arrangement is not that public policy is for sale, but rather how
cheaply it can be bought!
Among the important myths that Phillips explodes is that the last
two decades of American history have been unique. To the contrary,
he shows that speculative fever has a long pattern of occurrence and
that the end result each time is more concentration of economic
opportunity, not less (pp. 366-68). Furthermore, the so-called "democ
ratization" of finance in the age of personal computers had surpris
ingly little net impact.10 To be sure, the Internet enabled ordinary
Americans to access economic data that was previously the exclusive
province of financial elites. And electronic day trading by everyone
from teenage truants to Barbara Streisand meant that people were no
longer restricted to conventional channels of amassing wealth.
But the end results were largely unchanged. Millions of Americans
followed the stock markets, but it profited them not. One study found
"that 71 percent of families individually owned no shares or held less
than $2,000 worth" (p. 362). Phillips displays a devastating series of six
graphs taken from Barron's magazine but arranges them with the
following captions that he wrote:
1) As the stock indexes soared, pumped up by stockbrokers and analysts
2) the price-to-earnings ratio of Nasdaq stocks left sober precedent far
behind
3) dwarfing even the excesses of the late 1920's
4) as householders who had abandoned stocks . . . were lured back in

10. Pun intended.
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5) . . . by putting their money in equities [and] by taking on record levels
of margin debt
6) while the insiders sold out . . . . (p. 363)

The bottom line: "The history of the United States, in short, is full of
money and wealth-related democratizations . . . . But . . . they have
not, for more than brief periods or wave crests, notably changed the
concentration of wealth in general or the concentration of financial
assets in the hands of the top 1 percent" (p. 368). This is an important
reality that Americans have not yet begun to comprehend.
II. THE ROLE OF LAW
What, then, should law do about this dismal situation? That is
where Phillips is notably deficient. He devotes a scant five pages to the
U.S. tax system (pp. 218-23), and virtually ignores the one tax directed
at accumulations of wealth - namely, the federal estate tax. Nor does
he more than casually mention the . Social Security statutes or
Medicare laws, both of which have enormous potential for ameliorat
ing income disparities of the sort that Phillips documents so compel
lingly. To be sure, at the very end of the book he notes that "high
taxes on the assets, incomes, or consumption patterns of the rich - or
all three - could be used in the twenty-first century to fund the late
twentieth-century promises of entitlements like Social Security and
Medicare" (p. 422). At that point, he also makes an oblique reference
to inheritance taxation as a tool "to diminish wealth concentration" (p.
422). But no specifics are offered, no current proposals are considered,
and no substantive comment is offered on the tax legislation enacted
in June 2001,11 even though the book was not completed until January
of 2002 (p. viii).
This Part takes Phillips's critique seriously and considers various
legal developments from the standpoint of their likely impact on
America's economic inequality. This analysis begins with the tax
legislation previously mentioned and proceeds to health care and
Social Security.
A. Tax Act of 2001
The first major legislative enactment of the new Bush
Administration was the so-called Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001 ("2001 Tax Act").1 2 Its myriad provisions
may yet have some impact on "economic growth," but they have

115

1 1 . Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001,
Stat. 38 (codified as amended in scattered sections of l.R.C.).
12.

Id.

Pub. L.

No. 1 07-16,
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already provided "tax relief" to millions of American taxpayers. In
terms of addressing economic inequality, however, this legislation
could hardly have been more poorly designed. This Section focuses on
only three of its major provisions - namely, those with the greatest
impact on the issues addressed in Wea/th and Democracy.
1.

Estate Tax Repeal

No part of the 2001 Tax Act better encapsulates the insouciance
with which its proponents regard Phillips's concerns than the repeal of
the federal estate tax.1 3 To be sure, repeal does not take place until the
year 2010 and then for only one year,1 4 but those qualifications were
required by congressional budgetary constraints. The law's message is
clear nonetheless: the federal estate tax is irredeemably offensive to
the notion that wealth should be accumulated and transferred to
succeeding generations without governmental interference of any
kind.
Although the estate tax has not been a terribly effective deterrent
to dynastic accumulations of wealth, it makes an effort in that direc
tion. Thus, it falls only on estates of fewer than two percent of
decedents.15 Moreover, that limited level of coverage was before the
estate-tax exemption was increased by forty-eight percent, to one
million dollars, in 2002.1 6 This substantial increase was possible fiscally
because the resulting revenue loss was relatively small, further
testament to the extraordinary concentration of wealth in America
that Phillips documents in his book. The real money is in large estates:
in fact, more than half of the revenue generated by the estate tax
comes from estates of more than five million dollars,17 even though
they represent a tiny fraction of decedents.
In any case, the estate tax has never been as onerous an exaction as
its opponents have contended. Annual gifts of eleven thousand dollars

1 3. l.R.C. § 2210 (2000) (codifying§ 501(a) of the 2001 Tax Act). See generally Sanford
J. Schlesinger & Dana L. Mark, The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001: Title V, J. RETIREMENT PLAN., July-Aug. 2001, at 42.
14. l.R.C. § 2210(a) (2000) (added by Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 501(a), 1 1 5 Stat. 38, 69) (repeal after 2009); id. at§ 901(a),
1 15 Stat. at 150 (reinstatement after 2010).
15. See J acob M. Schlesinger & Nicholas Kulish, Will Power: As Paper Millionaires
Multiply, Estate Tax Takes a Public Beating - The Long Economic Boom Eases Many Mis
givings About Inherited Wealth - Gates Trumps Rockefellers, WALL ST. J., July 13, 2000, at
Al.
16. l.R.C. § 2010(c) (2000) (estate tax exemption of $675,000); id., amended by Eco
nomic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 521, 115
Stat. 38, 71 (exemption of $1,000,000 in 2003).
17. Computation done by author using data in Lynn Asinof, Heirs'
J., Feb. 26, 2001 , at Cl.

Losses for 'Avoidance' Industries, WALL ST.

Gains May Mean
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per beneficiary can reduce a person's taxable estate considerably. 18
And if the property owner is married, 19 she may double these amounts
each year - again per beneficiary - with zero tax consequences.
Furthermore, any amount left to a surviving spouse bears no estate tax
whatsoever, regardless of amount. 20 This generous provision, which
would enable Bill Gates to leave all of his billions to his wife Melinda
without owing any estate tax, is not a new tax gimmick - it has been
the law since 1981. 2 1
Other provisions also existed prior to 2001 that dramatically re
duce, if not eliminate, the estate tax on family businesses and farms. 2 2
For example, estate taxes due can be paid over a period of fourteen
years, with interest-only payments for the first four years. 23 This is
hardly the sort of calamity portrayed by the estate-tax repealers when
they cry that "you shouldn't have to meet the undertaker and the tax
man on the same day." Even in 1977, Professor George Cooper
described the estate tax as a "voluntary tax," because it had so many
escape hatches and acknowledged loopholes. 2 4 Nonetheless, oppo
nents of the estate tax successfully engineered its repeal in 2001 and
continue their efforts to make this repeal permanent. 2 5
As I have indicated elsewhere,26 the estate tax was vulnerable to
attack because its exemption amount had not kept up with the growth
of the U.S. economy. Perhaps an exemption of nine million dollars the approximate relative value of the estate tax's original exemption

18. I.RC. § 2503(b)(l) (2000),
3.24.

amended by

Rev. Proc. 2002-70, 2002-46 I.RB. 845, §

1 9. I.RC. § 2513(a)(l) (2000). See generally DAVID WESTFALL & GEORGE P. MAIR,
ESTATE PLANNING LAW AND TAXATION 'II 9.04[2J[a][ii] (4th ed. 2001).
20. I.RC.§ 2056(a) (2000).
21. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403(a), 95 Stat. 301 (codi
fied as amended at I.RC.§ 2056(a) (2000)).
22. See I.RC. §§ 2032A, 2057 (2000) (stating special valuation rules for farms and busi
ness real estate and special deduction fot "qualified family-owned business interests").
23. See I.RC.§ 6166(a) (2000). This payment schedule applies if at least thirty-five per
cent of an estate's value consists of closely held business interests.§ 6166 (a)(l), (b)(l). Oth
erwise, the estate tax is due nine months after the decedent's death. § 6075(a). See generally
WESTFALL & MAIR, supra note 19, at '!17.04.
24. George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax
COLUM. L. REV. 161, 161 (1977); see also William M. VanDenburgh & Philip
J. Harmelink, Estate Tax Planning Implications After the 2002 Mid-Term Elections, TAXES,
Jan. 2003, at 53, 56 ("Currently, through a variety of devices, extremely large estates (say
$50-100 million or more) can effectively plan around estate taxes.").

Avoidance, 77

25.

See

Permanent Death Tax Repeal Act of 2002, H.R 2143, 1 07th Cong. (2002).

26. Richard L. Kaplan, Crowding
10 ELDER L.J. 15 (2002).

Agenda,

Out: Estate Tax Reform and the Elder Law Policy

.
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amount27 - would have forestalled the repeal effort, but perhaps not.
This repeal effort, after all, is a perfect example of what Phillips
describes as the interaction of concentrated wealth and democratic
processes: a tax that is imposed on the very wealthiest of decedents is
targeted for repeal, because that is the same segment of the popula
tion that provides the bulk of political campaign financing. And both
major political parties joined in the repeal effort, because they feed at
the same campaign financing trough, validating Ralph Nader's pithy
characterization that the Democratic and Republican parties " 'have
morphed together into one corporate party with two heads wearing
different make-up' " (p. 320).
2.

Retirement Savings Incentives

The 2001 Tax Act increased the amount that working Americans
can contribute to special tax-favored savings accounts that are
intended to fund their retirement.28 Elsewhere,29 I analyzed the most
ubiquitous of these arrangements - the individual retirement
account, or IRA30 - and concluded that major structural defects exist
that mitigate against its presumed role in providing retirement income
to retired Americans. But there is no doubt that these accounts repre
sent attractive vehicles for channeling retirement-oriented savings. By
boosting the maximum contribution thresholds,31 therefore, the 2001
Tax Act seems to empower nonwealthy Americans to accumulate
wealth for themselves, no?

27. Id. at 20 (citing GARY ROBBINS & ALDONA ROBBINS, INST. FOR POLICY
INNOVATION, THE CASE FOR BURYING THE ESTATE TAX 8 (1999) (finding that the
equivalent amount in 1998 was $8,845,267)).
28. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 , Pub. L. No. 10716, §§ 601(a), 611 (d)(1), (e)(2), (f)(2), 115 Stat. 38, 94, 97-99 (amending I.RC.§§ 219 (b)(5),
402(g)(l), 457(e)(15), 408(p)(2) (1986)). The maximum contribution limits are increased
according to different schedules for the various types of retirement-oriented accounts as
follows:

Year

Individual
Retirement
Accounts

Salar� Reduction Plans
Under§ 401(k),
§ 403(b), § 457
SIMPLE

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

$3,000
$3,000
$3,000
$4,000
$4,000
$4,000
$5,000

$11,000
$12,000
$13,000
$14,000
$15,000
Indexed
Indexed

29. Richard

L.

Kaplan, Retirement Funding
7 ELDER L.J. 283 (1999).

Retirement Accounts,

30. I.R.C. § 408 (2000).
31.

See supra note 28.

$7,000
$8,000
$9,000
$10,000
I ndexed
Indexed
Indexed
and the Curious Evolution of Individual
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The ugly truth is that most eligible taxpayers were not contributing
the maximum allowable before the law was changed. Indeed, one
study by the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Tax Analysis
revealed that only four percent of eligible taxpayers contributed the
maximum amount of two thousand dollars to their IRAs.3 2 Who, then,
is likely to benefit as this threshold was raised to three thousand
dollars in 2002, on its way up to five thousand dollars in 2008?33
Obviously, only that elite group of IRA contributors who were
contributing the maximum amount previously, and probably only a
portion of that group, in fact.
The reasons for this lack of broader utilization of retirement
savings vehicles are varied, and these reasons are not confined to
IRAs. For example, even when employers set up retirement savings
plans at work - typically, 401(k) plans - and arrange for automatic
payroll deductions to fund these accounts, many employees do not
participate,34 or fail to fund their accounts to the maximum allowed
prior to the 2001 Tax Act.35 And if an employee did not put ten
thousand five hundred dollars36 into her 401(k) plan in 2001, will she
really put twelve thousand dollars into her plan in 2003?37 Get real!
The move to increase retirement savings plan limits, moreover,
ignored the biggest impediment to full funding of these accounts namely, the stagnating incomes of the nonwealthy, one of the major
themes in Phillips's book. An analysis by the Congressional Budget
Office in 2001 revealed that after-tax income in inflation-adjusted
32. See PETER ORSZAG & JONATHAN ORSZAG, WOULD RAISING IRA CONTRIBUTION
LIMITS BOLSTER RETIREMENT SECURITY FOR LOWER- AND MIDDLE-INCOME FAMILIES
OR Is THERE A BETTER WAY?, 2000 CENTER ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES 1 (citing
ROBERT CARROLL, OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, IRAS AND
THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1 997 (Jan. 2000)), available at http://www.cbpp.org/4-1200tax2.pdf; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GA0-01-846, PRIVATE PENSIONS:
ISSUES OF COVERAGE AND INCREASING CONTRIBUTION LIMITS FOR DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION PLANS 14-15 (2001) (stating that approximately eight percent of pension
plan participants would benefit from increased contribution limits).
33. l.R.C. § 219(b)(5)(A) (2000), amended by Economic Growth and Tax Relief Recon
ciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 601(a), 1 15 Stat. 38, 94.
34. See David Joulfaian & David Richardson, Who Takes Advantage of Tax-Deferred
Saving Programs? Evidence from Federal Income Tax Data, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 669 (2001).
35. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-98-5, 401(K) PENSION PLANS:
LOAN PROVISIONS ENHANCE PARTICIPATION BUT MAY AFFECT INCOME SECURITY FOR
SOME 3 (1997) (finding an average contribution rate of 7% of salary). During the survey pe
riod, the maximum contribution rate was 20%. EMJAY CORP., 401(K) ANSWER BOOK 8-14
(2000); see also SARAH HOLDEN & JACK VANDERHEI, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH
INST., BRIEF NO. 238, CONTRIBUTION BEHAVIOR OF 401(K) PLAN PARTICIPANTS (2001)
(finding a 6.8% contribution rate using 1999 data); David Cay Johnson, 401 (k) Changes Go
Unheeded, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2001, at C18 (reporting that only 1 1 % of 401(k) participants
made the maximum allowable contribution in 1999).
36. I.R.S. Notice 2000-66, 2000-2 C.B. 600.
37. I.R.C. § 402(g)(l)(A) (2000), amended by Economic Growth and Tax Relief Recon
ciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 61l(d)(l), 1 1 5 Stat. 38, 97-98.
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dollars had actually declined for the lowest twenty percent of U.S.
households from 1979 to 1997, and that the middle quintile had an
increase of less than five percent over this period, to slightly more than
thirty-three thousand dollars (p. 396). By contrast, income of the top
one percent had increased by more than two hundred and fifty percent
(p. 396). For most Americans, in other words, increasing the limits on
retirement savings contributions is an empty gesture. They simply
cannot afford to set aside even the old limit!
Even worse, legislation boosting retirement-account limits distracts
attention from a fundamental source of economic inequality namely, the lack of employer-provided pension coverage for an
increasing proportion of nonwealthy Americans.38 First, the profes
sionally managed "defined benefit" pension plan was phased out in
favor of "defined contribution" plans39 that put all of the control and all of the risk of investment failure - into the hands of individual
employees.40 Then, the "defined contribution" plan morphed into
salary reduction plans - 401(k)s, 403(b), 457, and the like - to which
employers provided only matching contributions, 41 and often not even
that.4 2 The increased risk of these plans was then augmented most
dangerously when employer stock became their principal investment,
as is often the case, 43 even after the Enron debacle and similar
calamities.
The end result of these changes is that the retirement income of
nonwealthy Americans is more precarious than ever before. The wide
spread decimation of 401(k) plans has only recently awakened most
Americans to the very real dangers that these plans present. And what
is the Bush Administration's response? Revise pension laws to
encourage defined benefit plans? Mandate matching contributions to
salary-reduction arrangements? Limit or restrict employer stock in
401(k) plans? Try boosting the amount that the wealthiest employees
38. See Richard L. Kaplan, Enron,
ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).

Pension Policy and Social Security Privatization,

46

39. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS (JCX-71-02, 2002), at 31; see also CRAIG
COPLAND & JACK VANDERHEI, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RES. INST., BRIEF NO. 223,
PERSONAL ACCOUNT RETIREMENT PLANS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEY OF CONSUMER
FINANCES 7-8 (2000).
40. See LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & RICHARD L. KAPLAN, ELDER LAW IN A NUTSHELL
357 (3d ed. 2003).
·

41. See EMJAY CORP., supra note 35, at 2-7 (stating that seventy-one percent of 401(k)
plans surveyed have matching contributions).
42. See CINDY HOUNSELL ET AL., WOMEN'S INST. FOR A SECURE RETIREMENT, YOUR
FUTURE PAYCHECK: WHAT WOMEN NEED TO KNOW ABOUT PAY, SOCIAL SECURITY,
PENSIONS, SAVINGS AND INVESTMENTS 26 (2002); EMJAY CORP., supra note 35, at 2-7.
43. See Daniel Kadlec, Time Bomh: 401 (k)s Stuffed With Employer Stock Are a National
Calamity, TIME, Mar. 5, 2001, at 84; Ellen E. Schultz, Employers Fight Limits on Firm's
Stock in 40/(k)s, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2001, at Cl.
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may contribute to their retirement accounts. A good idea for those
employees, .to be sure, but one that can only exacerbate the economic
inequality that retirement plans currently represent.
3.

Education Incentives

The 2001 Tax Act created several distinct incentives for funding
the costs of higher education, but most of these provisions are of
limited significance.44 For example, the maximum contribution to a
Coverdell Education Savings Account was increased from five
hundred dollars to two thousand dollars per year.45 Nice, but not likely
to have a serious impact on the disparity in economic resources facing
the next generation of college attendees.
One change, however, has far greater significance: the complete
exemption of certain college-savings plans from federal income
taxation.46 These plans, colloquially styled 529 plans because of the
Internal Revenue Code section that sets forth their essential features,
enable taxpayers to set up special accounts for college tuition as well
as the related room and board expenses.47 The plans are nominally
fashioned by state law, so the specifics vary among jurisdictions.48 But
their most fundamental appeal is a function of federal law: all invest
ment income and capital gains derived by the plans are exempt from
federal income tax, if the funds are used for the costs of higher
education.49 In addition, there is typically no time limit during which
the funds must be so used, unlike Coverdell Education Savings
Accounts, which require distributions by the time the named benefici
ary reaches thirty years of age.50
These accounts existed prior to 2001, but they lacked tax exemp
tion. Instead, the income tax was deferred until the student applied the
funds towards college expenses, and then the tax was imposed at the
student's presumably low income-tax rate.51 This arrangement was
44. See generally Richard L. Kaplan, Funding a Grandchild's College Education, 1.
RETIREMENT PLAN. Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 15 [hereinafter Kaplan, Funding a Grandchild's
College Education] .
,

45. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §
40l(a)(l), 115 Stat. 38, 57 (amending I.RC.§ 530(b)(l)(A)(iii) (2000)).
46. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §
402(b)(l), 115 Stat. 38, 61 (amending I.RC.§ 529(c)(3)(B)(i) (2000)).
47.

See

Kaplan, Funding a Grandchild's College Education, supra note 44, at 22.

48. See http://www.savingforcollege.com (last visited Jan. 2, 2003) (offering state-by
state compilation of available plans and their salient features).
49. I.RC. § 529(c)(3)(B)(i) (West Supp. 2002). Many states exempt this income from
their income taxes as well. See http://www.savingforcollege.com (last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
50. See l.R.C. § 530(b)(l)(E) (2000) (treating any unused balance as distributed when
the account beneficiary becomes thirty years old).
51.

See

Kaplan, Funding a Grandchild's College Education, supra note 44, at 20-21.
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certainly appealing, but the 2001 Tax Act made the deal that much
sweeter by exempting the plans' investment income and profits
from taxation entirely.5 2 As a result of this change, the investment
companies that operate these plans went into advertising overdrive,
and states that had not previously authorized such plans hastily did so.
From the standpoint of economic inequality, which is the focus of
Phillips's book, after all, why are these plans counterproductive?
Simply because they allow wealthy taxpayers to move substantial sums
off the tax rolls for the benefit of their privileged progeny. While
states set the maximum amount that can be contributed to their 529
plans, these limits often exceed a quarter of a million dollars per
named beneficiary.53 While most plans have low mm1mum
contribution levels,54 the real benefit is obtained by those who are able
to fund these plans up to the maximum allowable by law. And at a
time when access to higher education is increasingly becoming the
ticket to economic opportunity,55 the complete tax exemption of 529
plans exacerbates existing income and wealth inequalities and
operates to perpetuate these disparities into succeeding generations.
B.

Health Care

Fewer issues are more central to physical and financial well-being
than health care, in particular who will pay for health-care expenses.
For that reason, most modem societies provide some mechanism to
ensure that health-care financing does not become a source of
economic inequality. Not so the United States. Among the various
aspects of this critical subject, this Section considers only two - health
insurance and long-term care.
1.

Health Insurance

Most health insurance in the United States is provided to
nonelderly persons as a feature of their employment.56 But recent
52. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub.
16, § 402(b)(l), 115 Stat. 38, 61 (amending l.R.C. § 529(c)(3)(B)(i) (2000)).

L.

No. 107-

53. See http://www.savingforcollege.com (last visited Jan. 2, 2003) (stating that plans
allowing contributions of $250,000 or more include those of Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, the
District of Columbia, Florida, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, and West Virginia). The limit in South Dakota is $305,000. Id.
54. See http://www.savingforcollege.com (last visited Jan. 2, 2003) ($25-$50 per benefici
ary, often less with automatic-contribution arrangements).
55.

See generally

ACKERMAN & ALSTO IT, supra note 1.
'

56. FRONSTIN, supra note 6, at 4 (stating that four out of five nonelderly persons with
health insurance have employment-based coverage). Older Americans generally receive
health insurance through the federal government's Medicare program. See 42 U.S.C. §
1395c(l) (2000).
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trends, including the increasing use of "temporary" or part-time work
ers that Phillips describes in his book (pp. 133, 164), have led to more
Americans without health insurance.57 The legal response to this
problem was the Health Security Act, proposed by President Bill
Clinton in 1993.58 Although he artfully described Americans' plight as
"one paycheck away from being uninsured," the vast majority of
Americans had some sort of health insurance at the time and could
not identify with those who had no such insurance.59 Collectively, they
were comfortable with this fundamental economic inequality, even
though the financial consequences of an uninsured illness or accident
can be ruinous. The same impulse that tolerates a higher degree
of economic inequality in this country than in any other Western
democracy (pp. 123, 345-46) produced an attitude that can be summa
rized as: "I've got mine; get yours."
A very different American impulse created Medicare in 1965 to
pay for the medical costs of older Americans.60 The potentially
catastrophic costs of hospitalization have been essentially eliminated
through this statutory regime.61 Medicare's coverage extends to almost
all Americans age sixty-five and older, without regard to their specific
economic resources.62 Medicare, therefore; has been a major factor in
reducing the economic inequality of senior citizens with respect to
health-care costs. But this communitarian impulse did not carry the
day in 1993, and the Clinton health plan was unceremoniously dumped
without even the courtesy of a recorded vote.
Why was the response so different a generation earlier? For one
thing, most people could identify with older Americans. They knew
them personally and anticipated becoming older themselves some day.
In contrast, most Americans did not know people without health
insurance, or at least they did not know that they knew such persons,
and they certainly did not anticipate - let alone desire - to join
them.
But another factor was afoot: a general disdain of government in
all its forms, from taxation to social programs. This attitude was
captured sardonically by President Clinton when he observed that
"most of our folks think that the Government would mess up a two-

57. See FRONSTIN, supra note 6,
Expanding Health Insurance Coverage,
58.

See

at 8; see also Steven A. Schroeder, Prospects
344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 847, 847 (2001).

for

Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, S. 1757, 103d Cong.§ 1001 (1993).

59. See David Blumenthal,
MED. 465, 467 (1995).

Health Care Reform - Past and Future,

322 NEW ENG. J.

60. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). See generally FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 40, at 58-102.
61.

See

FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 40, at 67-68.

62.

Id.

at 58-63.
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car parade."63 After a decade of President Reagan exhorting the
citizenry that "government is not the solution, it is the problem,"
Americans collectively did not want to expand the reach of govern
ment programs, even if the result was more economic inequality.
2.

Long-Term Care

Another health-care issue that results in major economic
dislocation and inequality is long-term care. As I explained else
where,6 4 most older Americans have very limited coverage of long
term care expenses via Medicare, even though the cost of such care
can exceed one hundred thousand dollars per year in some areas.65 A
small percentage of this vulnerable population have private long-term
care insurance,66 but most are simply unprotected for such potentially
cataclysmic expenditures. Only the wealthy can approach this issue
with relative equanimity, but that is why this issue has not received
any significant governmental attention: the rich can take care of them
selves, so the issue is not on the government's radar screen.
Yet, the cost of long-term care may become one of the defining
sources of economic inequality as the wealth of the current generation
of older Americans is passed along. For the poor, this issue is fairly
benign, because their impoverishment, immediate or imminent,
ensures their entry into the Medicaid program,67 with its coverage of
long-term care costs.68 For those with more resources, however, long
term care costs pose an enormous threat to the transfer of wealth
between generations. These folks, with perhaps as much as one million
dollars in financial assets and equity in their residence, have no
exposure to the predations of the federal estate tax,69 but risk
economic devastation from the costs of long-term care. In another
context, I described this potential financial obligation as "a 100
percent estate tax on the middle class!"70

63. William J. Clinton, Remarks on the Reinventing Government Initiative,
PAPERS 1543, 1544 (Sept. 14, 1994).

in

2 PUB.

64. Richard L. Kaplan, Financing Long-Term Care in the United States: Who Should Pay
AGING: CARING FOR OUR ELDERS 65 (David N. Weisstub et al. eds.,
2001) [hereinafter Kaplan, Financing Long-Term Care in the United States].

for Mom and Dad?, in

65.

See

PHYLLIS R. SHELTON, LONG-TERM CARE PLANNING GUIDE 1 (2000).

66. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAOff-HEHS-00-196, LONG-TERM CARE
INSURANCE: BETTER INFORMATION CRITICAL TO PROSPECTIVE PURCHASERS - THE
CONSUMER RESOURCE FOR LONG-TERM CARE FINANCING 3 (2000) (stating that fewer
than ten percent of older Americans have long-term care insurance).
67.

See generally FROLIK

68.

Id.

& KAPLAN, supra note 40, at 106-12.

at 105-06.

69. I.RC.§ 2010(c) (West Supp. 2002) (estate-tax exemption).
70.

See

Kaplan, Financing Long-Term

Care in the United States, supra note

64, at 70.
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This source of economic inequality could be ameliorated if there
was political interest in doing so. I examined this issue at length
elsewhere71 and proposed that the Medicare statute be amended to
liberalize its restrictions on coverage of nursing-home expenditures.72 I
also suggested that private long-term care insurance be regulated73
along the lines that were enacted in 1990 for so-called "Medigap"
insurance.7 4 This change would standardize the available packages of
benefits to minimize consumer confusion and facilitate the informed
purchasing of this important coverage. Both approaches would reflect
current medical practices and the new realities of extended life.
A step in this direction was taken in 1996, but it was a very small
step. Some basic consumer protections were enacted in that year's
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.75 And the deus
ex machina of tax deductibility was applied to premiums for long-term
care insurance,76 but these tax benefits are usually more illusory than
real.77 While improvements to the tax treatment of these premiums
have been proposed,78 they have not yet been adopted. Accordingly,
long-term care remains an accident waiting to happen for most
Americans, an unanticipated financial calamity when the need for
such care arises. The longer this critical issue is not addressed, the
more it perpetuates economic inequality as the gains of the
nonwealthy are expended on the costs of long-term care.
C.

Social Security

In terms of budgetary significance and societal impact, no statutory
regime has more of an ameliorative effect on income inequality than
Social Security. It provides monthly benefits, adjusted for inflation, to

71. Richard L. Kaplan, Cracking the Conundrum: Toward a Rational Financing of Long2004 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).

Term Care,

72.

Id.

73.

Id.

74. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4351(a)(3), 104
Stat. 1388, 1388-126 (adding 42 U.S.C. § 1395ss(p) (2000)). See generally FROLIK & KAPLAN,
supra note 40, at 90-96.
75. See I.RC. § 7702B(b)(l)(C) (2000) (guaranteed renewability); § 7702B(g)(2)(A)
(compliance with certain model Act and model regulation provisions);§ 7702B(g)(3) (disclo
sure requirements);§ 7702B(g)(4) (nonforfeitability).
76. I.RC. § 213(d)(l)(D) (2000) (added by Health Insurance Portability and Account
ability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 322(b)(l), 1 10 Stat. 1936, 2008).
77. See Kaplan, Financing Long-Term Care in the United States, supra note 64, at 77
(giving extended example illustrating the minimal tax benefit from purchasing long-term
care insurance).
78. See Long-Term Care and Retirement Security Act of 2001, H.R 831, S. 627, 107th
Cong. § 2(c)(1).; see also Improving Access to Long-Term Care Act of 2002, H.R 4946,
107th Cong. § 2.
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thirty-two million retirees, seven million surviving spouses and minor
children, and another .seven million disabled Arhericans.79 It functions
as a combination retirement annuity, life-insurance policy, and
disability coverage.80 Income inequality in this country would be even
worse than Phillips documents if Social Security did not exist.
Yet, this ubiquitous program is under attack precisely because of
the conditions that Phillips describes, especially the impact of concen
trated wealth on the democratic process. President George W. Bush
campaigned on the issue of "privatizing" Social Security and created a
presidential commission charged with implementing that goal.81 .
But this issue first rose to political awareness in the presidential
campaign of Malcolm Stevenson ("Steve") Forbes III in 1996. This
personal embodiment of Phillips's thesis of concentrated wealth
distorting the political· agenda assailed Social Security by claiming that
folks could do better investing the money themselves.82 As I have
explained elsewhere,83 this is one of the most enduring myths
surrounding Social Security, one that fails to consider the full range of
benefits it provides to a variety of recipients in a multitude of circum
stances.
But one aspect of the Forbes critique sticks: Social Security's effort
to reduce income inequalities translates into less-impressive benefits
for those who are more financially secure.84 Usually, the issue is not
presented quite this starkly, but that is the crux of the privatizers'
complaint - namely, that Social Security reduces Americans' income
disparities, and some folks do not like being part of that process.
To understand this phenomenon even superficially, a simplified
example is necessary. Consider two workers, Ashlie and Sean, both of
whom have worked in employment covered by Social Security's tax
regime85 and are now entitled to retirement benefits. Assume further
that the average monthly earnings, indexed for inflation according to
Social Security's somewhat convoluted methodology,86 are $5,000 for
79. Social Security Online, Social Security Beneficiary Statistics, http://www.ssa.gov/
OACT/STATS/OASD!benies.html (last updated Dec. 17, 2002).
80.

See generally

FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 40, at 273-319.

81. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, STRENGTHENING SOCIAL
SECURITY AND CREATING PERSONAL WEALTH FOR ALL AMERICANS (2001), available at
http://csss.gov/reports/Final_report.pdf (last visited Jan. 1 1 , 2002).
82. See Christopher Georges, Forbes's Proposal to Restructure Social Security Suggests
System Is No Longer Political Third Rail, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1996, at A14.
83. Richard L. Kaplan,
(1995).
84.

See id.

Top Ten Myths of Social Security,

3 ELDER L.J. 191, 205-08

at 200-02.

85. See I.RC. §§ 3101(a)-(b), 3111(a)-(b), 312l (a)-(b) (2000);
KAPLAN, supra note 40, at 278-81 (explaining covered employment).
86.

See

FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 40, at 288-89.

see also

FROLIK &
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Ashlie and $2,500 for Sean. No doubt, Ashlie would expect that her
retirement benefit will be twice that of Sean's, since her average
earnings are twice his.
In many private pension systems, such proportionality would
indeed be the rule, but Social Security calculates its retirement benefit
by applying a three-part formula to a retiree's average lifetime
earnings.87 This formula is 90% -32%-15%, and the "bend points," or
bracket parameters (in 2003), are $606 and $3,653.88 So, for Ashlie, her
Social Security benefit is 90% of the first $606 of her average monthly
earnings, plus 32 % of the amount between the two "bend points"
($3,653 less $606 equals $3,047), plus 15% of her average monthly
earnings beyond the second "bend point" ($5,000 less $3,653 equals
$1,347). The result is a retirement benefit, or Primary Insurance
Amount ("PIA") in Social Security's terminology, of $1,725. In similar
fashion, Sean's PIA is 90% of the first $606 of his average monthly
wages, plus 32% of his remaining wages ($2,500 less $606 equals
$1,894), since his average earnings did not exceed the second "bend
point." His PIA, therefore, is $1,151.
Stripped of the arithmetic, the bottom line is as follows:
Average Wage
Recipient
Benefit
Ashlie
$5,000
$1,725
$1,151
$2,500
Sean
Clearly, Ashlie receives a larger benefit from Social Security than does
Sean, but her benefit is not twice as large as his (i.e., $1,151 times 2
equals $2,302), even though her . average monthly earnings are
precisely twice his. In this manner, Social. Security provides a propor
tionately larger benefit to the lower-income recipient, Sean in this
case. As a consequence, Social Security's retirement benefit calcula
tion mollifies the income disparity between higher- and lower-earning
workers to some degree. And therein lies the rub.
If the Social Security program were privatized, even in part, the
benefit-calculation methodology illustrated above would necessarily
change. In place of these guaranteed and bottom-weighted benefits,
affected workers would be exposed to the vicissitudes of the financial
markets. In all likelihood, lower-income recipients would do less well
than their higher-income counterparts in navigating the shoals of these
markets.89 The end result of Social Security privatization, therefore,

87.

See id.

at 286-87.

88. See Social Security Online, Table of Automatic Increases, http://www.ssa.gov/
OACT/COLA/autoAdj .html (last updated Oct. 18, 2002).
89. See Kathryn L. Moore, Partial Privatization of Social Security: Assessing Its Effect on
Women, Minorities, and Lower-Income Workers, 65 Mo. L. REV. 341 (2000). See generally
JOHN MUELLER, NAT'L COMM'N TO PRES. SOC. SEC., WINNERS AND LOSERS FROM
"PRIVATIZING" SOCIAL SECURITY (1999).
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would be more inequality of income for recipients, not less precisely the opposite of what Phillips contends is needed at this point
in America's history.
Ill.

CONCLUSION

Kevin Phillips has written an important book in Wealth and
Democracy, one that should give serious pause to lawmakers involved
in a wide range of critical issues facing America today. As he notes,
the increasing economic inequality of recent decades poses a signifi
cant challenge to the U.S. legal system and its democratic processes.
He contends that the status quo is "unsustainable" and that plutocracy
is where we are headed, if we are not already there (p. 422).
What the future holds is not particularly heartening. Repealing the
estate tax, creating retirement funding and education incentives that
primarily benefit financial elites, rejecting universal health insurance,
ignoring the "silent" crisis90 represented by the costs of long-term care,
and eliminating the redistributionist aspects of Social Security via
"privatization" - all of these developments point toward more
economic inequality, not less. One of Phillips's final chapters begins
with the observation of historian Arnold Toynbee that "what was
common to twenty-one past civilizations that had failed" was
" 'concentrated ownership' and the inflexibility of elites in dealing
with it" (p. 373). Yet, President Bush championed his program of tax
cuts with the slogan, "It's not the government's money, it's yours."
Obviously, a different message is needed if economic inequality is to
be arrested and democratic vibrancy restored. Bravo to Kevin Phillips
for setting out the path for those who are not too blind to see it.

90.

See Kaplan, Financing Long-Term Care in the United States, supra note 64, at 65.

